information; and improving public understanding of the potential and limits of genetics to prevent overly deterministic readings of genetic test results that expose people to social stigma.
Researchers also will study the eugenics movement and other social uses and misuses of genetic research, the likely priority of new genetic services in the health care system, the effects of commercialization on genetic services and research, and sociological implications of the genome project's dynamics and priorities. "There is a solid ethical and legal basis for therapeutic measures," Leenen writes, "and even for assumptions about the wishes of a future generation. The elimination of suffering and disease justifies decision-making on its behalf." But the situation is different, he believes, for eugenics (hereditary improvement by genetic control) or genetic enhancement. "The present generation should avoid using genetic engineering to impose its own ideas about personality, intelligence, character traits, talents and the like on future generations," he adds.
Prenatal Diagnosis and Reproductive Choice
In his article, "Prenatal Diagnosis and the Ethics of Uncertainty," in Biomedical Ethics; Eric T. Juengst describes the moral uncertainty of prenatal diagnosis as a medical practice because prenatal diagnosis is associated with selective abortion.
Juengst, acting chief of the ELSI Program Branch at the National Center for Human Genome Research, concludes that prenatal diagnosis is a tool parents should be able to use to make their own reproductive choices. But, he believes, access to such technology should be denied parents who seek prenatal diagnosis only for purposes of gender identification.
"The moral framework that will guide the practice of prenatal diagnosis as a mature medical technology is still emerging," Juengst writes. "Its foundations are in the ethical traditions of clinical medicine and genetic counseling, with their complementary imperatives to enhance fetal welfare and facilitate parental choice." Juengst continues, "As the next generation of diagnostic techniques raises new moral, conceptual and social uncertainties, the relationship between the traditions will be increasingly important to the practice's moral stability."
There Ought to Be a Law
In terms of NIH's ELSI program, Juengst is fielding criticism aimed at the branch's failure to produce a federal genetic privacy law and at the branch's unsuitability to act as its own watchdog.
"Given what we know about the history of other attempts to develop and introduce sweeping social legislation, . . ." Juengst says, "it's not surprising that three years into the effort we don't have a federal genetic privacy law."
Such an effort, he adds, is roughly equal in complexity to the human genome project itself. The criticism is less about a specific law than it is about "the sense that ELSI ought to deliver some tangible products," he says. "And the most visible kind of product is a law. There ought to be a law."
Asked when it would be reasonable to expect such a law, Juengst says he doesn't know if anyone "could predict the course of a piece of legislation like that." In the meantime, NIH's ELSI branch has delivered several policy-type products (as listed in the progress report) and has others in the works.
On the watchdog issue, taken up in an Office of Technology Assessment background paper released October 13, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public PolicyJuengst says, "We don't feel the work we sponsor is compromised by fact that we sponsor it. Grantees are free to speak their minds about the issues. On the other hand," he adds, "it is a challenge to corral these academics into a policy-making forum. It Volume 102, Number 1, January 1994
